Issuance of Orders of Detention under the Internal Security Act (ISA) against three self-radicalised Singaporean youths

Three self-radicalised male Singaporean youths were separately issued with Orders of Detention (ODs) under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in April, May and June 2026, respectively.  Though their cases are not related, all three were self-radicalised online by violent extremist ideologies, and had made preparations to conduct local attacks.

2.             The first case involved a 15-year-old Secondary Four student who was self-radicalised online by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s extremist ideologies, and supported terrorist/militant groups that were fighting against Israel, including HAMAS, Hizbollah, and the Houthis.  He planned to conduct an attack in Singapore in furtherance of ISIS’s cause, and establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia through violent means.

3.             The second case involved 19-year-old student in a tertiary academic institution, Tan Jun Jie (Tan), a staunch supporter of ISIS who had planned to engage in armed violence overseas and locally, including conducting knife attacks against Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel at Sembawang Air Base and LGBTQ students in his school.  He also attempted to conduct Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) cyberattacks against the websites of Muslim organisations which he deemed as deviant.

4.             As for the third case, a 14-year-old Secondary Two student was self-radicalised online by Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE).^[1]  Apart from being an ISIS supporter, he subscribed to aspects of far-right extremist ideologies and idolised mass shooters.  The youth was preparing to conduct a mass-casualty stabbing attack at his secondary school during the school holidays in June 2026.  He was arrested by ISD in May 2026, a month before his intended attack. 

15-year-old Self-Radicalised Youth^[2]

Radicalisation Process

5.             The youth’s radicalisation was triggered by HAMAS’s 7 October 2023 attacks against Israel, following which, he was exposed to a proliferation of content online depicting the suffering of Palestinians.  Around the same time, he had joined several online groups to learn more about Islam, where he encountered violent extremist content that encouraged support for terrorist groups.  Due to the youth’s excessive consumption of extremist narratives related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he developed a hatred for Israelis, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Zionists, and supported terrorist/militant groups fighting against Israel including HAMAS, Hizbollah and the Houthis, viewing their acts of violence as a form of jihad against Israeli oppression.^[3]  In 2024, he briefly considered travelling to Gaza to join HAMAS in fighting against the IDF on the frontlines of the conflict, and conducted cursory research online on potential travel routes.  However, he did not make further preparations for the travel as he felt that he lacked the resources to do so.  Instead, he took to social media to express his support for HAMAS and hatred towards Israel.  For example, he created and posted a video online, encouraging Muslims to undertake armed violence for the Palestinian cause.

6.             Concurrently, through the online groups the youth was active in, he developed an interest in historical Islamic caliphates and ISIS.  He became convinced of the need to establish an Islamic caliphate to revive the ‘Golden Era’ for Islam and for Muslims to live in a society ruled by sharia (Islamic law).  He felt proud about ISIS’s success in establishing a caliphate in Syria in 2014, and believed that ISIS’s use of violence was the most effective way to establish a caliphate. 

Plans to Establish Islamic Caliphate in Southeast Asia through Violent Means

7.             By mid-2025, the youth aspired to establish an Islamic caliphate within Southeast Asia through violent means, comprising Muslim-majority countries Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.  Termed the “Malaya Caliphate”, the youth believed that it would be easier to recruit like-minded individuals to this cause due to these countries’ proximity to Singapore.^[4]  He had considered starting his caliphate in the Indonesian province of Aceh, as it was already governed by sharia.  To prepare for engaging in armed violence, he sought information online on making homemade explosives.  To recruit for his caliphate, the youth created several chat groups on social media, and indiscriminately added his online contacts including his friends and family members.  In these chat groups, he shared pro-ISIS content.  He also created a flag to represent his caliphate, and obtained his mother’s assistance to print it via an e-commerce retailer (see Annex A for images of the flag).  He had told her that the flag was meant to show his support for Palestine.

Plans to Fight for ISIS

8.             In late 2025, the youth pledged allegiance to ISIS publicly on social media, and saw himself as an ISIS member thereafter.  He supported ISIS’s acts of violence, and saw ISIS fighters who died in the course of conducting such attacks as martyrs.  He also aspired to travel to Syria or Iraq to live under ISIS’s rule to support and fight for them.  To this end, he searched online for flights to Syria from Singapore, and for overseas shooting ranges where he could familiarise himself with weapons handling.  The youth also intended to use his future National Service stint to equip himself with firearms training, physical fitness and the mental resilience to fight for ISIS.  However, he did not have a timeline in mind for his travel.

Plans to Conduct Attacks in Singapore

9.             The youth believed that ISIS-inspired attacks, such as the December 2025 Bondi Beach shooting,^[5] were justified as revenge for the loss of ISIS fighters in battle.  He viewed secular states which labelled ISIS as a terrorist organisation, such as Singapore, as enemies of ISIS, and attacks by ISIS against such states as justified.  In this regard, he aspired to conduct an attack in Singapore in furtherance of ISIS’s cause, using ‘pressure cooker’ bombs that he had learnt about from an online video that he watched on the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.^[6]  He took preparatory steps by searching online for the cost of a pressure cooker and ways to make a ‘pressure cooker’ bomb.  He had also tried to find out about purchasing potassium nitrate after learning about its use as an ingredient to make HAMAS’s ‘Qassam’ rockets^[7] utilised during the 7 October 2023 attacks against Israel.  At the point of his arrest, he was in the early stages of planning.  He had yet to develop a timeline, location or target for his attack, but had visualised the attack to be conducted in an urban setting, with multiple civilian casualties.  While the youth claimed not to have shared his attack aspirations with anyone, his family and friends appeared to have been aware of his extremist views, but none reported him to the authorities.

Tan Jun Jie

Radicalisation Process

10.          Tan, a Muslim convert, began practising Islam in 2022 after being introduced to the religion through contents he consumed on social media.  In late 2022, he was exposed to the online extremist teachings of foreign preachers and subsequently to rigid and fundamentalist religious beliefs.  They primed him to be susceptible to pro-ISIS and other radical content online that he came across from January 2025 onwards.  By late 2025, Tan believed that armed violence was permissible against kuffar (disbelievers).  In his view, “disbelievers” comprised non-Muslims, Shi’ite Muslims and other Muslims whose understanding of Islam deviated from his, and individuals who served un-Islamic (secular) governments.  By January 2026, Tan saw himself as an ISIS member and took the bai’ah (pledge of allegiance) in his heart.  He became deeply convinced of ISIS’s religious legitimacy as he viewed ISIS as fighting “disbelievers” to establish an Islamic caliphate.  Tan admitted that he was willing to undertake any tasks to further ISIS’s cause, including carrying out attacks in Singapore, if ordered by ISIS.

Plans to Travel Abroad to Engage in Armed Jihad

11.          Tan wanted to travel overseas to undertake armed jihad, as he was convinced that he would attain martyrdom if he died while fighting on the battlefield.  He initially considered joining HAMAS in Gaza to fight against the IDF and explored the possibility of travelling to Gaza under the guise of humanitarian work, but abandoned this idea by January 2026 as he felt that it was not feasible to travel there.  Tan consequently planned to undertake armed jihad alongside ISIS in Somalia, as he strongly believed that the group was the only ISIS affiliate actively engaged in fighting “disbelievers”.  He searched for flights from Singapore to Somalia, and conducted research on bomb-making techniques to prepare for armed conflict abroad. 

Local Attack Plans

12.          Tan was inspired by the actions of ISIS fighters and was driven by his belief that killing “disbelievers” was religiously permissible.  To this end, he formulated attack plans against two groups of targets in Singapore in end-2025, and was prepared to be killed in the process of executing his attacks.  The first plot involved targeting SAF personnel stationed at the entrance of Sembawang Air Base as he deemed them enemy combatants serving the “kuffar Government” of Singapore.  The second plot was to target LGBTQ students at his school as he perceived their behaviour to be un-Islamic.  He prioritised the targeting of SAF personnel as he believed that he could attain greater divine rewards and increase his likelihood of dying as a martyr. 

13.          In preparation, Tan researched online on knife skills and identified a knife with a 10-cm blade which he had planned to purchase from a hardware store located in a local shopping mall to use in his attacks.  While he did not have any specific timeline in mind, he was prepared to carry out the attacks locally, if he was unable to travel to join ISIS in Somalia. 

14.          In early 2026, Tan harboured violent ideations about killing his Muslim acquaintances who disagreed with his religious ideologies.  He had imagined, while preparing food at home, that his kitchen cleaver was a knife to slit his acquaintances’ throats, mimicking executions in ISIS’s propaganda videos.  Fortunately, Tan’s acquaintances reported him to the authorities due to his extremist views and intention to enact violence locally and overseas. 

Cyberattack Attempts

15.          Tan admitted to undertaking DDoS^[8] cyberattacks in mid-2025 against the websites of several local and foreign Muslim organisations,^[9] using malware he had downloaded online to execute the attacks.  Viewing them as deviant, he wanted to render their websites inaccessible to protect Muslims from what he believed to be misguided teachings.  Tan had also recorded an oral declaration justifying his actions (see Annex B for the relevant transcription of Tan’s oral declaration).  However, as the websites remained accessible after his DDoS attempts, he decided against disseminating the recording as he was uncertain whether his attacks succeeded.  The Singapore Police Force is separately investigating Tan for potential offences under the Computer Misuse Act.

 14-year-old Self-Radicalised Youth^[10]

Radicalisation Process

16.          In 2024, the youth, then aged 12, encountered First-Person Shooter (FPS) games on the online gaming platform Roblox, which recreated real-life school shooting incidents, such as the 1999 Columbine High School shooting.^[11]  Out of curiosity, the youth searched for more information online, and learnt that several mass shooters had been victims of bullying, and their acts of violence were a form of retaliation against those who had wronged them.  The youth identified with these mass shooters, as he claimed to have also been a victim of bullying.  The youth also avidly consumed violent gore and mass shooting content that he encountered on social media, based on algorithmic recommendations, as well as from online channels he had joined, which were linked to the True Crime Community (TCC).^[12]  While playing the FPS games which recreated mass shootings and watching violent gore and mass shootings footage, the youth imagined his bullies as the in-game non-player characters (NPCs) and victims depicted within the videos, and himself as the perpetrator of the violent acts (see Annex C for screenshots of Roblox FPS gameplay in the youth’s possession, which recreated mass shootings).

Support for ISIS

17.          In 2024, the youth came across ISIS supporter Omar Mateen (Mateen)’s 2016 mass shooting on a gay nightclub in Florida, United States,^[13] on social media.  He idolised Mateen as he related with the latter’s experience of being bullied, and admired Mateen’s high kill count during the attack.  He believed it was justifiable to kill gay people, whom he considered to be haram (forbidden) in Islam.  The youth consumed more ISIS content, and came to support ISIS’s killing of kuffar, whom he defined as non-Muslims.  He was willing to attack non-Muslims if instructed by ISIS to do so.  Further, the youth considered travelling to Syria to join ISIS, but did not pursue this due to a lack of resources.  The youth shared ISIS-related videos with his friends, including several of his schoolmates, to flaunt his support for ISIS and promote the group.  None of his schoolmates were radicalised by his attempts.

Support for Far-Right Ideologies and Mass Shooters

18.          The youth’s consumption of mass shooting content also exposed him to far-right extremist materials, including anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi narratives.  Over time, the youth developed anti-Semitic views, including support for Adolf Hitler’s killing of Jews, as he believed that Jews were responsible for mistreating Palestinians in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  He also subscribed to the neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen Division’s accelerationist beliefs.^[14]  Further, he supported the notion of white supremacy, and considered individuals with fairer skin tones as superior to darker-skinned individuals.  The youth considered himself as more “White”, as he perceived himself to be fair-skinned.

Local Attack Preparations

19.          By late-2025, fuelled by personal grievances at being bullied by his schoolmates and put under academic stress by his teachers, the youth planned to conduct a mass-casualty attack against non-Muslim teachers and schoolmates at his school during the then-upcoming school holidays in June 2026.  He timed his planned attack with the school holidays as he thought there would be fewer teachers present to stop his attack, and had identified specific days when he and his targets would be present in school for co-curricular activities.

20.          The youth wanted to use firearms for his attack, but changed his mind due to Singapore’s strict anti-gun laws.  He then explored using a homemade bomb, and researched bomb-making materials and how to procure them.  However, he abandoned the idea as he did not have sufficient funds to purchase the materials, nor a suitable place to construct and test the bombs.  Instead, he chose to use a knife, stating that he had gained confidence in his ability to carry out a stabbing attack, after repeated online viewings of ISIS execution and stabbing tutorial videos.  The youth identified a kitchen knife and penknife from his home as potential weapons (see Annex D for images of the weapons the youth intended to use for his attack).

21.          The youth intended to livestream the attack, inspired by far-right terrorists, Brenton Tarrant (Tarrant) and Stephan Balliet (Balliet),^[15] and other mass shooters.  He idolised figures like Tarrant, despite disagreeing with his Islamophobic views.  The youth had searched an e-commerce site for tactical apparel to wear during the attack, as he wanted to mimic Columbine High School shooter Dylan Klebold’s outfit.  The youth saw his attack as a form of jihad, and intended to pledge allegiance to ISIS during his attack to mimic Mateen, and thereafter kill himself, to die a martyr.  He had hoped to honour the “first ISIS member in Singapore” through his attack.^[16]

22.          In January 2026, the youth drafted a 21-page manifesto which detailed his attack plan, including his choice of weapons and a list of his attack targets which included non-Muslim teachers and students at his school (see Annex E for extracts of his manifesto).  The manifesto featured neo-Nazi and far-right symbols, and glorified mass shooters whom the youth idolised.  He had titled his manifesto “A Call to Action” to encourage others who were bullied to stand up for themselves and respond with violence.  He planned to disseminate his manifesto on his social media accounts one day before his attack.  The detailed planning and preparation attest to the youth’s determination to follow through with his attack plan.  He admitted that he would have executed his attack, had he not been arrested by ISD.

23.          Fortunately, someone in his school had noticed his signs of radicalisation and alerted the authorities.

Severity of the Youth Radicalisation Threat

24.          These three cases drive home the severity of the youth radicalisation threat in Singapore.  These youths harboured a strong resolve to enact violence and were at varying stages of their attack plans and/or preparations at the point of their arrests.  Worryingly, all had identified easily available weapons such as bladed weapons for their intended attacks, and had sought out information online on making explosives.  It is fortunate that ISD was able to apprehend them in time.  In the past decade or so, more than half of the 23 youths dealt with under the ISA (including these three youths), intended to mount attacks in Singapore.  These radicalised youths are also getting younger.  The 14-year-old youth in the third case is the youngest to be detained under the ISA.^[17]

Dangers of Online Violent and Extremist Material

25.          Their cases also highlight the dangers and ready accessibility of violent and extremist material online.  Firstly, repeated exposure to gore materials and violent games, especially those that recreate and glorify past terror attacks and mass shootings, can normalise youths’ attitudes towards violence.  It can also prime them for radicalisation by making them more receptive to extremist narratives that advocate violence as a legitimate and necessary response to resolve perceived injustices or grievances.  Secondly, the youths were able to easily acquire ideas and know-how for their violent plans by researching online.  For instance, all three had searched for bomb-making information online, and the 15-year-old and 14-year-old had considered using homemade explosives for their local attacks.  Additionally, Tan and the 14-year-old youth had learnt lethal knife tactics from ISIS propaganda and execution tutorial videos.  Thirdly, Tan is the first self-radicalised individual dealt with under the ISA to have attempted cyberattacks in furtherance of one’s radical beliefs.  His case highlights the growing cyber dimension of the extremist threat, given the ready accessibility of online resources, such as malware and hacking tools facilitating cyberattacks.

26.          The authorities have, and will continue to block access to terrorist websites.  However, tackling the threat of harmful, extremist content online requires a whole-of-society effort.  The Government will continue to work with community partners on outreach efforts to raise public awareness of the radicalisation threat.  Public and parental vigilance can help guard against youths’ exposure to violent extremist content online.

Diversity of Violent Extremist Threats

27.          All three youths were ISIS supporters, who aspired to carry out violence both locally and overseas for the group.  Beyond ISIS, other forms of extremist ideologies, such as anti-Semitic, accelerationist and racial supremacist beliefs, also played a part in the radicalisation of the 14-year-old.  The 14-year-old is the third individual and youth dealt with under the ISA to be radicalised by CoVE, and the first detention involving CoVE ideologies.^[18]  Individuals radicalised by CoVE may have a shallow understanding of various extremist ideologies, and their support for such ideologies may be fluid.  However, the close shave in the 14-year-old’s case, highlights that the CoVE threat is no less severe.  Individuals motivated by CoVE have carried out deadly attacks overseas.^[19]  They are likely to have more potential triggers for violence given the multiple extremist ideologies they subscribe to, which can escalate quickly from radicalised beliefs to violent actions.

Importance of Public Vigilance and Early Reporting

28.          Anyone, regardless of demographic profile, is susceptible to radicalisation.  The authorities cannot detect every case in time.  Family members and friends are best placed to notice possible indicators of radicalisation.  The majority of youths dealt with under the ISA, including these three youths, had shown signs of radicalisation to their family and friends, such as sharing their extremist views and pro-ISIS contents with them.  Fortunately, Tan’s acquaintances and someone in the 14-year-old’s school had reported him to the authorities.   

29.          ISD reminds the public to remain vigilant to signs that someone around us may have become radicalised, and seek help from the authorities early.  Doing so allows the suspected radicalised individual to get the help they need, and keeps society safe.  In some cases, early reporting can allow the individual to be managed without having to use the ISA.  The three youths will undergo a holistic rehabilitation programme to address their religious/ideological misconceptions, and psychological and social vulnerabilities.  ISD will also work closely with the youths’ families and schools to facilitate their continued studies while in detention. 

30.          Regardless of the extremist ideologies involved, possible signs of radicalisation include, but are not limited to, the following:

a.    Displaying signs or symbols of extremist/terrorist groups (e.g., displaying ISIS’s flag as one’s social media photo);

b.    Frequently surfing radical websites;

c.     Demonstrating a fascination with extreme violence, gore and weapons;

d.    Posting/sharing extremist views on social media platforms, such as expressing support/admiration for terrorists/terrorist groups as well as the use of violence;

e.    Sharing extremist views with friends and relatives;

f.      Making remarks that promote ill-will or hatred towards people of other races, religions or communities;

g.    Expressing intent to participate in acts of violence overseas or in Singapore; and/or

h.    Inciting others to participate in acts of violence.

31.          Anyone who knows or suspects that a person has been radicalised, or is involved in terrorism-related activities, should promptly contact ISD at 1800-2626-473 (1800-2626-ISD).

INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT

27 JULY 2026

^[1]           CoVE, which ISD has previously referred to as ‘salad bar’ extremism, refers to a form of violent extremism where individuals subscribe to multiple, and sometimes conflicting, extremist ideologies, rather than adhering to a coherent or unified worldview.  This results in a personalised composite belief system, which the individual uses to justify violence.  The term CoVE is aligned with more current literature on this ideological typology.

^[2]           The 15-year-old is not named in this press release due to his young age.

^[3]           The youth also expressed support for what he termed as other “resistance groups” fighting against Israel, including Jenin Brigades, Lions’ Den, and Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which are reportedly affiliated to HAMAS.

^[4]           The youth did not consider Singapore to be part of his “Malaya Caliphate” as Singapore is not a Muslim-majority country.

^[5]           On 14 Dec 2025, a father and son duo carried out an ISIS-inspired terror attack targeting the Jewish community who were gathered for a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia, using firearms and improvised explosive devices.  The attack killed 15, and injured 40 others.

^[6]           On 15 Apr 2013, two brothers who were self-radicalised by Islamist extremist ideologies, planted two homemade pressure cooker bombs that detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon.

^[7]           ‘Qassam’ rockets are simple steel artillery rockets developed and deployed by HAMAS’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. 

^[8]           A DDoS attack aims to overwhelm a target system such as a website or server with excessive traffic to disrupt its service and render it inaccessible, usually by forming a botnet of multiple devices.  

^[9]           They included the websites of the Muhammadiyah Association (Singapore), Jaafari Muslim Association Singapore and a foreign Ahmadiyya organisation.

^[10]          The 14-year-old is not named in this press release due to his young age.

^[11]          On 20 April 1999, high school seniors Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris killed 14 and injured 23 others in a mass shooting and attempted bombing at Columbine High School in Colorado, United States, before taking their own lives.

^[12]          These included footage of mass shootings by school shooters and far-right terrorists, videos of Mexican drug cartel executions, as well as ISIS executions.  The youth had downloaded thousands of such videos and images on his personal electronic devices, and viewed many of the videos repeatedly.

              The TCC is a broad, decentralised online subculture where individuals glorify, celebrate, and exhibit fan-like behaviour towards perpetrators of extreme violence, including serial killers and mass shooters.  In extreme cases, this leads to a replication of the attacks, driven by personal grievances, a desire to pay tribute to the original attackers, or to garner notoriety within the TCC. 

^[13]            The shooting on 12 June 2016 killed 49 people and wounded more than 50 others.  Mateen had sworn allegiance to ISIS over the phone to the police during the attack.  Mateen died after being shot by the authorities.

^[14]          Atomwaffen Division is associated with far-right accelerationism, which is predicated on the belief that the world’s systems are broken and need to be destroyed, before they can be rebuilt for the betterment of society. 

^[15]          Tarrant is the perpetrator of the mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019, which killed 51 people, while Balliet fatally shot two passers-by near the Halle synagogue in Germany on 9 October 2019, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, after futile efforts to attack worshippers within the synagogue.  They had livestreamed their attacks.

^[16]          The youth was likely referring to Syria-based Singaporean ISIS fighter Megat Shahdan, who was the first Singaporean to be featured in an ISIS propaganda video, and was believed to have been killed in the conflict zone.

^[17]          Apart from this 14-year-old youth, three 14-year-old self-radicalised youths were separately issued with Restriction Orders (ROs) under the ISA in June 2024, and September and November 2025.  Please refer to ISD’s press releases dated 15 July 2024, 9 September 2025 and 28 January 2026 for details.

^[18]          The two other CoVE individuals, a 14-year-old youth and 19-year-old Cyrus Dzulqarnain Al-Shahriar, were separately issued with ROs in September 2025 and March 2026, respectively.  Please refer to ISD’s press releases dated 9 September 2025 and 24 June 2026 for details.

^[19]          For example, in August 2022, 20-year-old Ethan Miller opened fire at a grocery store in Oregon, United States, killing two and injuring two others before committing suicide.  He reportedly claimed inspiration from the 1999 Columbine High School shooting, expressed misogynistic and racist sentiments, and aired grievances related to the Covid-19 pandemic, but did not adhere to a single ideological category.

            In December 2024, 15-year-old Natalie Rupnow shot and killed a teacher and student, injuring six others at the Abundant Life Christian School in Wisconsin, United States.  She then fatally shot herself.  She was reportedly motivated to violence by a combination of factors.  She had allegedly expressed admiration for the 1999 Columbine High School shooters, as well as racist and anti-Semitic views online.