Issuance of Orders under Internal Security Act (ISA) to two Singaporeans & arrest of a foreigner under ISA

In December 2024 and January 2025, two self-radicalised Singaporeans, 18-year-old student Nick Lee Xing Qiu (Lee), and 56-year-old housewife, Hamizah binte Hamzah (Hamizah), were issued with an Order of Detention (OD) and Restriction Order (RO)¹ under the ISA respectively.  Lee was radicalised by violent far-right extremist ideologies and aspired to conduct attacks against Malays and Muslims in Singapore.  Hamizah’s radicalisation was triggered by the ongoing Israel-HAMAS conflict.  She supported the Axis of Resistance (AOR), a network of Islamist militant and terrorist organisations including HAMAS, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (AQB), Hizbollah and the Houthis.    

2.             Separately, in November 2024, 34-year-old self-radicalised Malaysian, Saharuddin bin Saari (Saharuddin), who was working as a cleaner in Singapore, was arrested under the ISA and repatriated to Malaysia.  Saharuddin was a supporter of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), HAMAS and AQB, and wanted to travel to overseas conflict zones such as Syria and Gaza to engage in armed violence. 

Nick Lee Xing Qiu

Self-Radicalisation Process

 3.            Lee started forming an antipathy towards Muslims in early 2023, after coming across Islamophobic and far-right extremist content on social media.  Beyond consuming far-right extremist material recommended to him by online algorithms, Lee also spent several hours a day searching for and consuming extremist online content.  In June 2023, Lee searched for the livestreamed video footage of far-right terrorist Brenton Tarrant (Tarrant)’s attacks against Muslims in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019 and watched the video repeatedly, becoming desensitised to the violence in the video.  He idolised Tarrant and started role-playing as Tarrant in a violent online simulation game, downloading video game modifications so he could pretend to be Tarrant killing Muslims at the Al-Noor Mosque in Christchurch (one of the mosques that Tarrant attacked).

 4.            By early 2024, Lee had developed a strong enmity towards Malays/Muslims² as well as other ethnicities traditionally targeted by far-right extremists including Jews, Mexicans, African-Americans, and Indians, believing that killing them was justified.  Lee identified as an “East Asian supremacist”, believing in the superiority of Chinese, Korean and Japanese ethnicities.  He had come across these ethno-supremacist ideas in his online searches for far-right extremist content and resonated with them given his Chinese ethnicity and antipathy towards Muslims.  He was also supportive of white supremacy because he felt that Islam was a threat to white culture. 

 5.            In September 2024, to visibly showcase his allegiance to the far-right community, Lee got a tattoo on his right elbow of a sonnenrad (sun wheel or black sun), a symbol which was featured on Tarrant’s manifesto and rucksack during the Christchurch attack (see Annex A for a photo of the tattoo).³  He also ordered t-shirts on an online shopping platform, which he custom-printed with the sonnenrad and totenkopf (skull)⁴ logos, which are commonly used by neo-Nazi, white supremacist and other far-right groups (see Annex B for photos of the t-shirts). 

 Local Attack Aspirations

6.            Lee aspired to carry out attacks against Muslims in Singapore with like-minded far-right individuals that he conversed with online.  While he claimed to lack the courage to conduct an attack alone, he admitted that he would have participated in attacks together with his online contacts.  His attack aspirations included conducting a Tarrant-style attack on Muslims at a mosque in Singapore, using homemade guns, knives, and Molotov cocktails.  He had hoped to livestream the attack online and dedicate the attack to Tarrant.  He also considered building Molotov cocktails with his online contacts and throwing them at his Malay Muslim neighbours during a religious holiday.  He believed that the use of Molotov cocktails would increase the chances of casualties.  Lee had enquired online on how to make a Molotov cocktail, but took no further preparatory steps. 

 7.            Lee was deeply convinced by the Great Replacement Theory⁵ commonly referenced by far-right extremists, and believed that violent action had to be taken to prevent the Chinese majority in Singapore from being supplanted by what he perceived to be a rapidly growing Malay population.  To this end, Lee envisioned starting a “race war” between Chinese and Malays in Singapore, by creating anti-Malay/Muslim propaganda to post online, to generate animosity between Chinese and Malays, and force Malays out of Singapore or be killed.  To instigate others to conduct attacks against Malays/Muslims, Lee started a social media account in late 2024, which he used to re-post far-right extremist videos and upload about 20 self-created videos that glorified far-right terrorists and contained anti-Malay/Muslim rhetoric. 

8.            Lee’s family members, teachers and schoolmates were unaware of his radicalisation, and there is no indication that he tried to influence them with his violent extremist views.  At the point of his arrest, Lee’s attack ideations were aspirational and he had no timeline to carry them out.  Investigations into Lee’s online contacts have not surfaced any imminent threat to Singapore.

 Hamizah binte Hamzah

Self-Radicalisation Process

 9.            Hamizah’s radicalisation was triggered following HAMAS’s 7 October 2023 attacks against Israel.  She started following news of military operations by the AOR, and consumed online content on the suffering of Palestinians.  Hamizah joined several social media groups that encouraged support for the AOR’s violent operations.  She developed a hatred for Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), believing they should be eradicated for their actions against Palestinians.   In this regard, she became a fervent supporter of the AOR, seeing its members such as HAMAS, AQB, Hizbollah, and the Houthis, as mujahideen (fighters), and their violent acts as being justified.  She also had a deep admiration for HAMAS spokesperson Abu Obaidah (Obaidah), and was willing to entertain AOR-linked militants if contacted by them, to further her knowledge of Obaidah. 

 Propagating Support for the AOR and Armed Violence

10.         As Hamizah felt that she did not have the physical prowess and necessary resources to take up arms in the Israel-HAMAS conflict, she showed her support by posting pro-AOR content, including those glorifying armed violence and martyrdom, on her social media accounts.  She was committed to garnering support for AOR, and would create new accounts whenever her accounts were banned for the violent content she posted.  She also actively participated in pro-AOR social media groups, where she frequently voiced her enmity towards Israel and the IDF, and made violent threats against their supporters.  She also encouraged others to engage in armed violence against the IDF.

 11.         Hamizah was the sole administrator of several pro-AOR social media groups with membership ranging from 16 to over 1,000.  She took pride in being the administrator of these groups, and saw it as her responsibility to ensure that pro-AOR and anti-Israel narratives were actively propagated in them.  She would also frequently share the groups’ links with her pro-AOR online contacts in a bid to grow her groups’ memberships.

 12.         Hamizah had no attack plans nor intentions to engage in armed violence locally or overseas.  However, her staunch support for the AOR and their violent operations, her willingness to spread propaganda to promote their cause, and incitement of others to engage in armed violence, render her a security concern.  Hamizah’s family members were unaware of her radicalisation.  She intentionally tried to keep her extremist views from them, for fear of censure. 

 Saharuddin bin Saari

13.         Saharuddin’s path to radicalisation began in 2014 when he encountered online materials on ISIS’s participation in the Syrian conflict.  Through sustained exposure to pro-ISIS materials, Saharuddin was convinced that ISIS was the prophesied Black Flag Army (BFA)⁶, which would defend Muslims during the End-of-Times (EoT).⁷  By 2017, Saharuddin was a staunch ISIS supporter, pledging allegiance to ISIS’s self-declared Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.⁸  Even after the demise of ISIS’s so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq in 2019, he actively posted materials promoting ISIS and armed jihad on his social media accounts. 

14.         Saharuddin aspired to die a martyr performing armed jihad against the perceived enemies of Islam, and fight alongside any group trying to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.  He also harboured the intention of travelling to Syria to join ISIS since 2015.  To this end, he researched online for ways to enter Syria, and sought to establish contact with ISIS militants who could facilitate his entry.  Sometime in 2015-2016, an online contact who identified himself as a Malaysian ISIS fighter, advised Saharuddin to take a flight from Kuala Lumpur to Turkey, and offered to escort Saharuddin from Turkey to Syria by land.  Saharuddin did not proceed with his travel plans primarily as he did not have sufficient funds.

15.         Following HAMAS’s 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel, Saharuddin expressed support for HAMAS and AQB, which he viewed as legitimate defenders of Muslims.  He interpreted the escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict as a sign of the imminent EoT.  Saharuddin perceived HAMAS and AQB as part of the BFA and considered travelling to Gaza to fight alongside AQB.  He researched online on travel routes to Gaza, but lacked the funds for his travel plans.

 16.         Saharuddin had no specific attack plans against Singapore, nor had he radicalised anyone in Singapore.  However, he was willing to undertake acts of violence in Singapore should he perceive Singapore as siding with the enemies of Islam.  ISD had worked closely with the Malaysian Special Branch (MSB) on the investigations into Saharuddin.  His Work Pass was cancelled and he was repatriated to Malaysia and handed over to MSB in November 2024 upon the completion of ISD’s investigation. 

 Self-Radicalisation Threat Stems from Various Drivers of Violent Extremism

17.         These cases underscore the persistent terrorism threat Singapore faces, especially from self-radicalised individuals.  Such individuals increasingly subscribe to a variety of violent extremist ideologies, including narratives that leverage on overseas conflicts.  Radicalised individuals, as seen from these recent cases, come from diverse profiles.  Anyone, regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, religion or nationality, can fall prey to radicalisation. 

 Far-Right Extremism a Growing Concern

 18.         Far-right extremism is a growing security concern globally, and Singapore has not been immune to this threat.  Though far-right extremism is often associated with white supremacy, its broader messages promoting ethno-religious chauvinism, racism, and xenophobia, can still appeal to non-whites. Lee is the third Singaporean to be dealt with under the ISA, who was radicalised by far-right extremist ideologies.  The first two far-right extremism cases had also involved youths.⁹  Youths may be more susceptible to such ideologies and may gravitate toward the sense of belonging and identity that far-right movements appear to provide. 

Zero-Tolerance Stance on Support for Terrorism and Importance of Early Reporting

 19.         The Government takes a serious view of any form of support for terrorism or extremist ideologies in Singapore – whether by Singaporeans or foreigners.  ISD will take firm action against any individual in Singapore who supports, promotes, undertakes or makes preparations to undertake armed violence, regardless of how they rationalise such violence ideologically or where the violence takes place.  It is also critical to guard against any form of hate speech and/or divisive rhetoric that could threaten Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society.             

 20.         ISD reminds the public to remain vigilant to signs that someone around us may have become radicalised, so that the authorities can intervene early to avert a tragedy.  Family members and friends are best placed to notice changes in behaviour.  Possible signs of radicalisation include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Frequently surfing radical websites;

• Posting/sharing extremist views on social media platforms, such as expressing support/admiration for terrorists/terrorist groups as well as the use of violence;

• Sharing extremist views with friends and relatives;

• Making remarks that promote ill-will or hatred towards people of other races, religions, or communities;

• Expressing intent to participate in acts of violence overseas or in Singapore; and/or

• Inciting others to participate in acts of violence.

 21.         Anyone who knows or suspects that a person has been radicalised should promptly contact the ISD hotline 1800-2626-473 (1800-2626-ISD).  

INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT
10 FEBRUARY 2025

[1] A person issued with a RO must abide by several conditions and restrictions. For example, the individual is not permitted to change his or her residence or employment, or travel out of Singapore, without the approval of the Director ISD. The individual also cannot access the Internet or social media, issue public statements, address public meetings or print, distribute, contribute to any publication, hold office in, or be a member of any organisation, association or group, without the approval of Director ISD.

[2] Lee assumed that all Malays were Muslims.

[3] The sonnenrad, also known as the sun wheel or black sun, reportedly has ancient origins from Norse and Celtic cultures. The modern form of the sonnenrad was believed to have been popularised in Nazi Germany and has been widely adopted by neo-Nazi groups and far-right groups and individuals over the years, to promote ideas of an “Aryan heritage”, supremacy of the “European culture”, and belief in racial purity.

[4] The totenkopf depicts a skull-and-crossbones motif. The motif has been used historically as a symbol for death, danger, as well as piracy. It was reportedly used as a military emblem by the Prussian army in the 1700s. It gained prominence after being used by the Schutzstaffel (SS) in Nazi Germany as the unit’s insignia, and continues to be associated with anti-semitic and neo-Nazi beliefs.

[5] The Great Replacement Theory, commonly referenced by white supremacists and other far-right terrorists, propagates the idea that the indigenous white population in Western countries are in danger of being replaced by non-white immigrants through migration and demographic trends. Tarrant drew heavily on this theory in his manifesto, which he titled “The Great Replacement”.

[6] The BFA is a prophesised Muslim army carrying black flags led by the Imam Mahdi, the saviour of Muslims, which will emerge in Khorasan (believed to be modern-day Afghanistan) to engage in a final battle with non-believers during the End of Times. Terrorist groups such as ISIS have misappropriated the imagery of the black flags to garner support for their struggle for power.

[7] EoT prophecies discuss apocalyptic signs, the destruction of the universe, and Judgment Day (where humans will be held accountable for their deeds by God).

[8] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died after he detonated a suicide vest during a US-led military raid against his hideout in Syria in October 2019.

[9] The other two individuals are:

• A then-16-year-old who was detained in December 2020 after making detailed plans and preparations to conduct terrorist attacks using a machete against Muslims at two mosques in Singapore. He was released from detention in January 2024 on a Suspension Direction after making good progress in his rehabilitation; and

• A then-16-year-old who was issued with a RO in November 2023. He had identified as a white supremacist, and aspired to conduct attacks overseas in furtherance of the white supremacist cause.

Annex A

LEE’S ELBOW TATTOO OF A SONNENRAD¹⁰

[10] Lee made modifications to the design to make it less painful. Specifically, the black inner circle was not coloured to avoid pain in his elbow joint.

Annex B

LEE’S CUSTOM-MADE T-SHIRTS WITH THE SONNENRAD AND TOTENKOPF SYMBOLS