Issuance of Restriction Orders under the Internal Security Act against two self-radicalised Singaporeans

1. Two self-radicalised Singaporeans, a 14-year-old male youth, and a 33-year-old female, An’nadya binte An’nahari (An’nadya), were issued with Restriction Orders (RO)¹  under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in June and July 2024 respectively.  

2. The two had been separately self-radicalised online. Their radicalisation came from a common trigger, the ongoing Israel-HAMAS conflict.  The Secondary Three student aspired to fight for the Black Flag Army (BFA)²  and considered carrying out attacks in Singapore.  He is the youngest individual to be issued with an ISA order.³   An’nadya, a former Manager with a Statutory Board, staunchly supported the Axis of Resistance (AOR), a network of Islamist militant and terrorist organisations including HAMAS, Al-Qassam Brigades (AQB), Hizbollah and the Houthis.  She also advocated violence against Israelis and Jews.  She is the second public servant to be issued with an ISA order.⁴

Issuance of Restriction Order against Self-Radicalised Singaporean Youth

Self-Radicalisation Process

3. The youth's radicalisation was triggered by HAMAS's 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel, and occurred within a short span of months after extensively viewing online pro-HAMAS content and news.  By January 2024, the youth regarded Palestinian militant groups like HAMAS, AQB and Al-Quds Brigades as "legitimate defenders of Palestine" and was supportive of their violent acts.  He also believed that HAMAS's 7 October attacks were justified and that all "Zionists" were enemies to be killed. ⁵

4. While researching online, the youth saw material which prophesised the impending End of Times (EoT)⁶   and the rise of the BFA in Khorasan (historical terms referring to parts of modern-day Afghanistan).  Over time, he became firmly convinced that the EoT would occur in his lifetime, and that it was his obligation as a Muslim to fight for the BFA upon its emergence and die as a martyr.

Preparations to Join the BFA

5. To prepare himself to join the BFA, the youth began adhering strictly to segregationist beliefs.  For example, he was of the view that celebrating birthdays and talking to his female classmates were forbidden under Islamic law.  He also took steps to prepare himself physically to fight for the BFA. He planned to save money by working part-time to fund his travel to Afghanistan, where he believed the BFA would emerge. The youth was resolved to join the BFA even if the authorities or his family tried to stop him.        

6. The youth tried, unsuccessfully, to radicalise several schoolmates.  The youth wanted to recruit them to fight with him alongside the BFA, and to help him carry out his attack aspirations.   To this end, he started an online chat group and invited six of his schoolmates to join.  In the chat group, he shared videos and links on armed violence, as well as several videos of himself as a terrorist fighter.  In these videos, which were inspired by his admiration for HAMAS spokesperson Abu Ubaida, the youth warned against trusting non-Muslims and spoke about the virtues of dying righteously as a martyr for Islam.   

Local Attack Aspirations 

7. The youth was willing to conduct attacks in Singapore on the BFA’s instructions, if he could not travel to join the BFA.  Beyond this, the youth hoped to expand the membership of his online chat group to 60 – 100 people.  Once he had amassed sufficient numbers, he aspired to conduct attacks against non-Muslim communities during their local festivals such as Chinese New Year, Christmas and Deepavali.  He hoped such attacks would instil fear amongst non-Muslims, to deter them from such “un-Islamic” festivities, and facilitate the establishment of an Islamic state in Singapore. 

Rehabilitation Programme 

8. ISD’s investigation to date indicates that the youth acted alone and was unsuccessful in radicalising or recruiting his school mates.  While his family members were unaware of his radicalisation, his parents had noticed expressions of the youth’s increasingly segregationist beliefs, but did not think they warranted intervention and assistance.  

9. As part of the youth’s rehabilitation programme, he will undergo religious counselling by the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) to address the religious misperceptions that have contributed to his violent and extremist ideology.  He will also receive psychological counselling by an ISD psychologist, to address the non-ideological factors that rendered him vulnerable to radicalisation.  Given his young age, he will be assigned with a RRG mentor.  ISD officers will also be working closely with the youth’s family and school to ensure that he has adequate support to stay on track with his rehabilitation, and that his studies will not be disrupted.  

Issuance of Restriction Order against 33-year-old Singaporean An’nadya 

Self-Radicalisation Process

10. An’nadya first attracted security interest in May 2021 for online posts which had the potential to incite social disharmony.  She did not exhibit radical inclinations then, and had deleted her online posts after being advised by the authorities.  She came to attention in April 2024 for her online activities, which included threats to attack and kill Israelis.  An’nadya’s radicalisation started after HAMAS’s attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023.  She started watching online videos of the situation in Gaza, many of which showed Palestinians being killed.  She also joined several social media groups, many of which shared information on military operations by HAMAS and its military wing, AQB.  She subsequently became aware of the AOR and their military operations.  

11. She began to view the groups under the AOR as resistance fighters, despite knowing that they had been designated as terrorist organisations in several jurisdictions. 

Participation in Pro-AOR Social Media Groups 

12. An’nadya actively participated in several pro-AOR social media groups, where she would identify herself as a Singaporean and openly express her support for the AOR and their violent operations.  She frequently expressed her enmity towards Israel and Jews, and made violent threats against them. An’nadya also called for violence against Singapore.  

13. An’nadya maintained close online contact with several foreign pro-AOR individuals from her chat groups, and exchanged violent, extremist views in private messages with them.  In March 2024, one of An’nadya’s male foreign contacts started a new social media channel, intended to spread awareness of the AOR’s military operations and garner public support for the AOR.  He invited An’nadya to join the channel and to be an administrator, to which she agreed.  She volunteered to draft a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the channel, to ensure that the channel’s content remained focused on encouraging support for the AOR and its violent operations.  An’nadya shared the channel’s invite link with her family members and friends to encourage them to join, but was unsuccessful in recruiting them.

14. An’nadya’s staunch support for the AOR and their violent operations, and her willingness to spread propaganda to promote their cause, render her a security concern.  Further, her close online contact with foreign extremist elements renders her vulnerable to being exploited or recruited for terrorist activities.  Despite being advised in 2021 to be mindful of her social media activities, An’nadya did not heed the advice. Instead, she escalated her online activities to the point of participating in radicalisation.  She was aware that her online activities and support for the AOR were against the law, and had thus refrained from mentioning her extremist activities and views to her colleagues at the Statutory Board.  

Overseas Conflicts Can Impact Domestic Threat Landscape

15. These cases highlight that overseas conflicts continue to have an impact on Singapore’s domestic threat landscape.  That two Singaporeans have already been self-radicalised in the few months following the latest escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict, is illustrative of the radicalising risk that foreign extremist narratives  can pose to our national security and social harmony. ⁷  It is thus critical that we not allow extremist narratives surrounding external developments to take root in our society, even as we continue to be deeply and rightly concerned with the situation in Gaza. ISD encourages the public to remain vigilant against elements who encourage or legitimise acts of terrorism and violent extremism.  We will take firm action against any individual in Singapore who supports, promotes, undertakes or makes preparations to undertake armed violence, regardless of how they rationalise such violence, or where the violence takes place. 

Youth Radicalisation and Importance of Early Reporting

16. Youth radicalisation continues to be a pressing security concern.  The 14-year-old youth case attests to the reality that youths are susceptible to online radicalisation and that those being radicalised are getting younger.  To date, ISD has dealt with 13 self-radicalised youths aged 20 and below under the ISA since 2015.  

17. The 14-year-old youth case and An’nadya’s case serve as reminders that anyone, regardless of age, gender, religion or profession, is susceptible to radicalisation.  As both cases highlight, such radicalisation can occur quickly, in the short span of months, reinforcing the importance of public vigilance and early intervention. We must remain vigilant to signs that someone around us may have become radicalised, and quickly seek help for them, so that the authorities can intervene early to avert a tragedy.  Family members and friends are best placed to notice changes in behaviour and alert the authorities if they suspect their loved ones have been radicalised.  In doing so, they would be saving the individual from getting involved in violent activities that could harm themselves and others.  In the cases of the 14-year-old youth and An’nadya, both families had noticed shifts in their behaviour and views, but did not recognise them as possible signs of radicalisation.  

18. Possible signs of radicalisation include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Frequently surfing radical websites;

b. Posting/sharing extremist views on social media platforms, such as expressing support/admiration for terrorists/terrorist groups as well as the use of violence; 

c. Sharing extremist views with friends and relatives; 

d. Making remarks that promote ill-will or hatred towards people of other races, religions or communities;

e. Expressing intent to participate in acts of violence overseas or in Singapore; and/or 

f. Inciting others to participate in acts of violence.

19. Anyone who knows or suspects that a person has been radicalised should promptly contact the ISD Counter-Terrorism Centre hotline 1800-2626-473 (1800-2626-ISD).  

INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT

[1] A person issued with a RO must abide by several conditions and restrictions. For example, the individual is not permitted to change his or her residence or employment, or travel out of Singapore, without the approval of the Director ISD. The individual also cannot access the Internet or social media, issue public statements, address public meetings or print, distribute, contribute to any publication, hold office in, or be a member of any organisation, association or group, without the approval of Director ISD.

[2] The BFA is a prophesised Muslim army carrying black flags led by Mahdi, the saviour of Muslims, which will emerge in Khorasan (believed to be modern-day Afghanistan) to engage in a final battle with non-believers during the End of Times. Terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have misappropriated the imagery of the black flags to garner support for their struggle for power.

[3] Prior to this, the youngest individual was a then-15-year-old male Singaporean who was detained under the ISA in December 2022. He was a self-radicalised supporter of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The youth had considered conducting attacks in Singapore and wanted to establish an Islamic caliphate through violent means.

[4] An’nadya was an employee with the statutory board at the point of investigation. She is no longer employed by the Statutory Board.

The first public servant is former Ministry of Education teacher Mohamed Khairul Riduan bin Mohamed Sarip, then aged 38, who was issued with an Order of Detention in November 2022 for making plans to travel to Gaza to engage in armed conflict alongside HAMAS and AQB. He remains in detention.

[5] The youth identified Zionists to be those who aim to reclaim Palestinian land. However, he was unable to differentiate between Jews and Zionists.

[6] EoT prophecies discuss apocalyptic signs, the destruction of the universe, and Judgment Day (where humans will be held accountable for their deeds by God).

[7] Two Singaporeans were previously detained under the ISA for wanting to carry out armed violence because they were affected by the Israel-Palestine conflict. In addition to former Ministry of Education teacher Mohamed Khairul Riduan bin Mohamed Sarip who was detained in November 2022 (see footnote 4), Amirull bin Ali, then 20 years old, was detained in March 2021 for planning to carry out a knife attack against Jews at the local Maghain Aboth Synagogue, and for planning to travel to Gaza to join AQB to fight against Israel. He was primarily driven by his strong feelings towards the Israel-Palestine conflict. In March 2023, he was released on an RO after making good progress in his rehabilitation.